In this paper we study the performance of a hybrid sourcing mechanism gaining popularity in industrial procurement environments. Under this hybrid sourcing mechanisms, a buyer initially procures her parts from multiple suppliers with possibly different quality levels, for T time periods, i.e., she parallel sources. During this time, the buyer is able to observe (noisy signals about) the suppliers' quality. At time T , she selects the supplier with the highest observed performance and awards it the remainder of her business. We characterize the optimal duration of the parallel sourcing period as a function of the supplier characteristics. Furthermore, we demonstrate that such a hybrid sourcing strategy can be more profitable for the buyer than selecting the highest quality supplier at time 0 and sole sourcing entirely.
Introduction
Advances in information technology have opened new venues for companies to create flexible supply chains by offering high-speed communication and tight connectivity. A growing number of companies are taking advantage of new opportunities to outsource portions of their production and other operations. For example, Cisco focuses mainly on the research, development and marketing of its products, and relies heavily on outside suppliers to manufacture and distribute its products. Today, many companies, from the electronics, pharmaceutical, automotive and other industries, are moving towards a similar organizational form by focusing on their core competencies and outsourcing significant portions of their business operations.
This increased reliance on outside suppliers for integral inputs into the production process underscores the importance of the supplier selection mechanisms. A supplier can greatly influence the final quality of a buyer's product, via the supplier's technology capabilities, skilled worker base, reliability of delivery and product reliability. One need only point to the recent events between Ford Motor Company and Firestone Tire company to understand the critical importance of these quality attributes in a buyer-supplier relationship.
As suppliers play a larger in more critical role in supply chains, properly creating and managing the supply chain is increasingly important. Buyers no longer rely on suppliers for only commodity products, but also for the procurement of pivotal components in their production process. This implies that the quality of the suppliers, their willingness to invest in new technology and flexibility in responding to the marketplace and buyer's demands are critical for the final success of a buyer-supplier relationship. Ideally, the buyer would be able to perfectly assess the suppliers' quality and select the optimal investment levels for the suppliers to undertake. However, buyers who do not "foot the bill" for desired investments are rarely able to dictate and perfectly observe the suppliers' investments (known as the moral hazard problem in the economics literature). Therefore, buyers do not typically know the exact suppliers' quality levels nor are they able to perfectly monitor investments (quality-improving) activities undertaken by suppliers. Traditionally, the economics literature has suggested as a remedy to this moral hazard problem that the buyer "sell the firm" to a supplier at a fixed price. By doing so, the buyer makes the supplier the residual claimant of any investments it undertakes, thereby instilling the proper incentives for the supplier to exert the optimal investments. While a theoretically elegant solution to motivating the optimal investment levels, it is rarely a realistic solution in practice.
When a buyer faces a set of suppliers of unknown quality and unobservable investments, she must design a sourcing arrangement that allows her to both extract some information about the suppliers and encourage (costly) investments on their part. In many cases, a supplier is able to improve its quality by making investments in the relationship, for example, by training its employees or investing in new and better equipment. While the buyer would like the supplier to undertake costly investments in the relationship so as to improve its quality, the buyer is rarely willing to pay the supplier for these investments. 1 This investment is costly to the supplier; therefore the supplier must be provided with the proper motivation to undertake such investments. Under a sole sourcing arrangement, whereby the buyer guarantees to purchase all of her inputs from the supplier at a pre-specified fixed price per unit of input for the entire contract duration, a buyer is able to coax higher investment levels from the supplier than if she were to multiple source. This is because a supplier facing a larger payoff is more willing to invest to increase its quality. While sole sourcing establishes positive incentives for the supplier to invest and improve its quality, it does not allow the buyer the opportunity to learn about the suppliers technology types and quality until after the contract has been awarded.
One increasing popular competitive supplier selection method is an auction. However, when supplier quality is an equally if not more important criterion than price in the supplier selection process, an auction may not be the appropriate selection mechanism; for the least-cost supplier is not necessarily the highest quality supplier. For example, in 1992, General Motors (GM) utilized auctions to select suppliers in a major efforts to reduce supplier costs. However, their focus on price resulted in a great sacrifice in quality. Their chosen "least-cost" supplier of ashtrays for the Buick Roadmaster provided ashtrays that were so ill-fitting that they caused a six-week delay in production. In another incident, GM selected a supplier that bid 5 percent below the supplier the managers preferred; half of the low-price supplier's parts failed quality tests, and GM asked the "losing" vendor to be their supplier after only 4 days. In order to keep up with production schedules, the new vendor had to deliver parts by charter plane, and the second supplier speculates that GM's 5 percent savings turned into a 15 percent loss (Lewis (1995) pg.38). When supplier quality is of critical importance to the buyer, the design of alternative supplier selection mechanisms that allow suppliers to compete on the basis of quality, in addition to cost, becomes necessary.
Another method used by the Department of Defense, Solectron, and Toyota 2 (amongst others) to identify high quality suppliers and provide them with the incentive to improve their quality is to initially dual (parallel) source with (possibly new or incumbent) suppliers. As the buyer observes the suppliers' quality (via, for example, its output), the buyer begins to redistribute her business among the suppliers by increasing her reliance on observed high quality suppliers. The buyer may choose to terminate her business with one (or more) observed low quality suppliers. By awarding greater portions of her business to a well-performing supplier, the buyer creates a tournament in which the suppliers compete for the "prize" -a larger share of the buyer's business. This type of sourcing arrangement can be a tremendous success for the buyer.
In the 1970's, the Department of Defense found itself saddled with a highly defective/low quality F100 engine produced by Pratt and Whitney. As the sole producers of this engine, Pratt and Whitney were unresponsive to the Air Forces pleas for a higher quality product. In order to combat Pratt and Whitney's complacency, the government decided to outsource a portion of its engine business to General Electric. In this paper we seek to establish when parallel sourcing is an appropriate strategy for the buyer. We consider a buyer who faces a group of suppliers with possibly different quality levels. The buyer would like to procure her parts from the highest (final) quality supplier, where final quality is determined by a supplier's current quality and any costly investment undertaken as a result of the buyer-supplier relationship. The buyer is considering using the following hybrid sourcing strategy: parallel source for T periods and then sole source for the remaining time. The buyer will select the sole supplier by observing the suppliers' performance over the T periods and awarding the sole sourcing contract to the supplier with the highest exhibited quality.
If the suppliers agree to enter into such a sourcing arrangement with the buyer, they have the opportunity at time 0 to make an one-time irreversible investment to improve their qualities 3 . We argue that a buyer may find it optimal to follow such a hybrid strategy, with T > 0 and characterize the optimal duration of the parallel sourcing period as a function of the supplier characteristics.
We find that the benefits of this hybrid sourcing during the selection process are two-pronged. As stated before, the buyer often does not know the suppliers' quality, hence parallel sourcing gives the buyer a chance to observe and learn more about the suppliers' qualities. In addition, parallel sourcing improves the buyer's profitability via heightened competition among suppliers. Interestingly, we find that even if the buyer were able to perfectly assess the suppliers' quality and choose the highest one, she may still prefer to parallel source from both suppliers for some portion of time. This is due to the "tournament" structure of the procurement mechanisms and the positive effect increased competition has on the supplier's willingness to invest in the relationship with the buyer and improve its performance.
The organization of the rest of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature on tournaments and competition in procurement mechanisms. We set forth our model in section 3 and obtain the equilibrium strategies of both the buyer and suppliers given a particular parallel sourcing contract. Finally, we demonstrate several structural properties of the equilibrium strategies through numerical examples in section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
3 For example, a supplier may purchase new equipment or educate its workforce.
Literature Review
The idea of constructing a tournament so as to coax higher performance from agents has been widely used to motivate sales people in marketing departments and studied by economists (Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Green and Stokey (1983) , Kalra and Shi (2001) .) In this literature, the sales people, or agents, are competing to win prespecified prize. Agents can exert a one-time irreversible effort to increase their expected output, however their true output level is subject to an exogenous random shock. The principal awards the prize(s)
to the agent(s) with the highest output level. Taylor (1995) extends these models by allowing agents to decide whether or not to exert effort in each of T periods. Taylor studies the equilibrium effort behavior of agents who are competing in a research tournament. The agent who produces the innovation with the highest value to the sponsor (principal) at time T , is awarded a prespecified prize. A strong assumption made in all of these papers is that agents are ex ante identical. This assumption implies that the principal does not need concern herself with selecting the "wrong" agents, but rather with how to design the prizes so as to attain the maximum output/highest innovation value from her workers.
A second strand of literature examines the behavior of agents who are competing in a race. In a race, the finish line is well-defined and does not depend on other agents' actions (hence the models studied in Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983) , Kalra and Shi (2001) , and Taylor (1995) are not races). Building on earlier works by Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) , Harris and Vickers (1985) and Grossman and Shapiro (1987) examine a complete and perfect information model where two agents are competing to win the race. An agent moves closer to the finish line by an amount of w(z) when it makes an investment of z. Agents alternate in deciding how much to invest and progress towards the finish line. Harris and Vickers (1985) study the case where the two agents may be differ in their valuation for the prize, their discount rates, their efficiency at making progress and their initial distances from the finish line. Based on the asymmetries between the agents, they are able to characterize the players' equilibrium investment behavior. Grossman and Shapiro (1987) assume that the agents are (ex ante) identical, allow the agents' progress to be stochastic in nature and consider only a single intermediate decision step (i.e., the agents must decide how much to invest at t = 1 and 2). Given this framework, they characterize the agents' optimal investment behavior.
The model used by Harris and Vickers (1985) is similar to our own in that it incorporates asymmetric agents and allows the value of the prize to differ for each agent. However, our model and hence analysis, differs from both of these papers due to the fact that parallel sourcing with a tournament is not a race (since the finish line is not well-defined), but rather depends on the other suppliers' actions.
A third strand of literature stemming from the operations management research area is concerned with how different supplier-buyer arrangements impact the performance of the supply chain. To our knowledge, the only paper within this area that addresses the issue of agents within an echelon competing for a prize based on performance is by Cachon and Lariviere (1999) . In their paper, Cachon and Lariviere study the performance of a "turn-and-earn" reward mechanism used for allocating a supplier's scarce resources amongst retailers in a two period model. Under a "turn-and-earn" mechanism, a retailer's future allocation of resources is determined by its past sales. The focus of their analysis and model differs substantially from ours in that their focus is on the mechanisms ability to coordinate the supply chain. In addition, the retailers in their model are ex ante identical, again obviating the need to select the "best" retailer.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, several papers address the issue of quality in a buyer-single- inspection policies in an incomplete information framework. These models differ from our own in that the emphasis is not on supplier selection but rather on "managing" a currently selected supplier. Furthermore, in these papers the contract parameters of interest are the rebate, warranty and inspection policy, while our focus is on the duration, T , of a contract.
The closest paper to our own is by Seshadri (1995) . Seshadri considers a dual sourcing arrangement where several suppliers bid to be one of two suppliers chosen to produce a fixed (equal) quantity. After suppliers bid and the two lowest bidders are chosen for production, the suppliers can choose to exert effort to reduce their total cost of production. After production, the suppliers will be paid their actual cost plus a portion of a divisible prize, with the lower cost supplier being awarded a larger share of the prize. Seshadri finds that, while under dual sourcing, by definition, two suppliers of unequal costs must be paid instead of one, the presence of competition and a prize lessens the cost of effort. At times, the presence of competition and associated reduction in cost is greater than the increase in having two suppliers and a dual source arrangement is optimal. Seshadri's model differs from our own in that suppliers must compete in an auction to be selected and are paid on a cost-plus basis (versus a fixed price per unit in our paper). In addition, he assumes that the buyer knows the suppliers' total costs (not their individual components) and is able to award the prize perfectly to the lowest cost supplier.
Model
We focus on a buyer who wishes to purchase a necessary input, a in the production of her final product, A, is given by a real function C(·) which satisfies the following conditions.
+ is twice continuously differentiable and strictly increasing with C (0) = 0, lim x→U C (x) = +∞, and C > 0 for all x ≥ 0 (namely, C is strictly convex).
While the buyer is unable to directly observe the suppliers' quality and investment levels, she does observe the number of units final product A that are returned. While the buyer faces a maximum demand of 2D per period, the actual demand (number of units A that result in a final sale) that a buyer faces depends on the quality of the supplier's product. The probability that a customers will return the final product for a full refund is increasing in q. In addition to the supplier's component, it is possible that other components or external factors render the final product defective. We assume that the buyer is unable to detect (or it is 4 For example, the only variable cost is the cost of labor, and both suppliers hire from the same labor pool.
cost prohibitive for the buyer to detect) which component causes the final product to be defective; the buyer is only able to observe the number of units returned by customers. We capture these external factors by the random factor ε i , where ε i has a truncated distribution of a random variable with a mean of zero and a variance of σ. 5 As a result, the time-average fraction, at time t, of units supplied by supplier i per unit time that result in a final sale over interval [0, t] , denoted by F (q i , I i ), is a truncated normal random variable with a mean given by f (q i , I i ) and variance of σ 2 . That is, the number of final units of A that result in final sales (are not returned) is determined by the supplier's quality, investment and a complex interaction of factors in the supply chain that is captured by σ (that are not attributable to the supplier's quality). From the definition of F (q i , I i ), it is reasonable to expect that σ 2 decreases in t. We assume that f (q, I) and σ have following properties.
Assumption 2 σ is a continuously decreasing function of t.
+ is continuously differentiable in q and twice continuously differentiable in I. Moreover, f (q, I) is strictly decreasing in q, strictly increasing in I, strictly concave in I, and
The buyer decides to parallel source with both suppliers for some initial duration T . For all practical purposes, we assume that T is taken from an arbitrary finite set T ≡ {t 1 
6 She equally divides her total demand amongst the two suppliers and procures D units per time period from each of them,
i.e., she offers each of them the contract (p S , D, T ). (We ignore all holding and set-up costs and assume that the production of a and demand realization for A are instantaneous.) At time T , she switches over the entire production to the supplier whose components resulted in the highest observed final sales, and offers that supplier the contract (p S , 2D, 1 − T ). We assume that suppliers are paid for each unit that results in a final sale. Furthermore, we assume that production of an input can be costlessly switched from one supplier to another at any time during the final product's life and that the suppliers have sufficient capacity to supply the buyer's entire order.
Benchmark
As a benchmark against which to compare the performance of parallel sourcing, we will consider the case where the buyer can directly observe each suppliers' quality and selects only the high quality supplier for the entire duration. The buyer offers the supplier a contract of the form (p S , 2D, 1), where p S is the price paid per unit of a, 2D is the total number of units demanded per period and the contract duration is 1. The high quality supplier who is presented with a contract of the form (p S , 2D, 1) will choose an investment level I H that solves the following optimization problem,
By Assumption 1 and 3, the objective function in (1) is strictly concave in I. Thus the supplier's optimal investment level is the unique solution of the following first order condition.
The buyer's profit under optimal investment by the supplier is given by 2Df (q H only , I *
Remark 1 When the high quality supplier is offered the contract (p S , 2D, 1), its optimal investment level
I *
H only is always less than the optimal investment level I * H in the case where the investment decision is made centrally by the buyer.
The above remark follows from the standard "double-marginalization" argument. Results in later sections indicate that our hybrid sourcing mechanism can mitigate the double-marginalization problem in certain scenarios by inducing investment levels higher than I * H only .
Parallel Sourcing with a Tournament
Now we consider the case when the buyer does not know each suppliers' quality with certainty and follows the hybrid strategy of parallel sourcing with a tournament. Under parallel sourcing, the buyer awards both suppliers equal amounts of her expected business (D) to each supplier for T periods. At time T , she switches over the entire production of 2D per period (i.e., sole sources) to the observed higher quality supplier (i.e., the supplier with the lower fraction of returned units) for the remainder of the demand period. When the buyer parallel sources for a duration T , she can observe noisy signals about the supplier's type by observing the number of units returned. If the duration for parallel sourcing is very small, then it is possible for the buyer to incorrectly choose the low quality supplier at time T , due to the noisiness of the quality signal.
However a small T implies a larger prize, which may stimulate higher investment levels from the suppliers.
On the other hand, as the duration of parallel sourcing increases, the buyer is able to gather more information about each supplier and to make a more informed decision at T , but the size of the prize decreases.
The determination of the optimal contract duration T can be solved as a Stackelberg game. The buyer presents both suppliers with the same contract (p S , D, T ), that satisfies each suppliers' individual rationality constraint. Without loss of generality, we assume that the suppliers have an outside opportunity cost of zero and are therefore willing to accept any contract that yields them a nonnegative expected profit. After both suppliers accept the contract, they both simultaneously decide on and undertake their optimal investment levels.
In solving the game, we distinguish two different scenarios: In the first scenario, the buyer and suppliers know that there is exactly one high quality and one low quality supplier in the market. In the second scenario, the buyers and suppliers know only the possible quality levels q H and q L , but no one knows whether there are two identical or different suppliers in the market. In sections below, we solve for the suppliers' and buyer's optimal actions given the two information structures.
Case I: one high quality supplier and one low quality supplier
In this scenario, the buyer and suppliers know that there is exactly one high quality and one low quality supplier in the market. Under parallel sourcing, the high quality supplier who is presented with a contract of the form (p S , D, T ) will solve the following optimization problem.
where
) and I * L is the low quality supplier equilibrium investment level. Similarly, the low quality supplier will solve the optimization problem expecting an equilibrium investment level of I * H from the high quality supplier.
Anticipating the optimal investment levels (I * H , I * L ) exerted by the suppliers under (p S , D, T ), the buyer chooses the duration of the contract to maximize her profit, i.e., max
The objective function of supplier q H in (3) 
Assumption 4 Given model parameters
(q H , q L , σ, D, p M , p S ,
c), the respective global maximums of (3) and (4) are unique for every (I L , T ) and (I
This is a relatively mild assumption since it would be satisfied under common assumptions such as concavity.
For instance, sufficient conditions for it to hold include (3) and (4) being strictly concave or strictly unimodal
in I H and I L , respectively.
Under the above assumptions, we will show that the pure strategy Nash equilibrium investment levels I * H and I * L exist for every T ∈ T (details in section 3.3). Moreover, the objective function of the buyer as given in (5) takes on a finite number of values and attains its maximum value at the corresponding optimal parallel sourcing duration T * ∈ T . As a result, {T * , (I * H , I * L )} is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this buyer-supplier game. In principle, one can resort to envelope theorems to investigate the dependence between equilibrium strategies {T * ,
However, the equations obtained by applying envelope theorems to the objective functions of the buyer and suppliers arising from our Stackelberg game model are neither insightful nor tractable. We choose to illustrate the structural properties of the equilibrium strategies through numerical simulation in Section 4.
Case II: two mixed or identical suppliers
In this case, the suppliers know their own quality levels but neither the suppliers nor buyer know whether the two suppliers are of the same or different quality levels. However, it is a common knowledge that the fraction of high quality suppliers among all suppliers is α. Namely, the probability that any one supplier is a high quality supplier is p H = α and the probability that it is a low quality supplier is
(This scenario is a more realistic extension to that of Case I.) Under this scenario, parallel sourcing holds the potential drawback of reducing the optimal investment undertaken by each supplier without the added benefit of differentiating the high quality supplier from the low quality one.
A high quality supplier with q H determines the investment level by maximizing the following objective function.
A low quality supplier with q L solves a similar optimization problem, given below.
Given the suppliers' equilibrium behavior, the buyer selects the optimal contract duration so as to maximize her profit.
Similar to Case I, we assume that the objective functions in (6) and (7) have unique global maximum at
, the respective global maximums of (6) and (7) are unique for every (I L , T ) and
Again, if the objective functions in (3) and (4) profit-maximizing problems. That is, the messy first order conditions makes the approach of analytically solving for equilibrium investment levels impractical, let alone solving analytically for T * . Nevertheless, as indicated above, we are able to establish the existence of a pure strategy SPNE to the entire game. In the next section, we provide rigorous arguments regarding the existence of a SPNE {T * , (I * H , I * L )}. In addition, we comment on the conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibrium
We first introduce some notations and definitions. Let h 1 (I H , I L , T ) and h 2 (I L , I H , T ) denote the objective functions in (3) and (4), respectively.
For every ( In order to show that g 1 and g 2 are continuous functions, we need the two lemmas stated below. 
Lemma 2 (Theorem of the Maximum) Let
X ⊆ R l and Y ⊆ R m , let h : X × Y → Rg(x) = max y∈Γ(x) h(x, y) is continuous in x. G(x) = {y ∈ Γ(x) : h(x, y) = g(x)}
Proof.
For any x and y = Γ(x), the fact that Γ is u.h.c. at x implies that every sequence x n → x and the corresponding sequence y n = Γ(x n ) has a convergent subsequence with the convergence point being y and y ∈ Γ(x). Moreover, y = y since Γ is single-valued. This is true for every convergent subsequence of {y n } and {y n } is in a compact set. Thus, y n → y and Γ is also l.h.c. at x. So, Γ is continuous.
A direct application of Lemma 2 and 3 to g 1 and g 2 yields the following lemma. (6) and (7) in Case II. Proof. We start with the proof for Case I.
Proof. Let the function h(x, y) in Lemma 2 be h
where g i (i = 1, 2) are given by (9) . The equilibrium investment levels (I * For Case II, the arguments are the same except that the functions h 1 and h 2 are defined differently according to the appropriate supplier objective functions in Case II. This completes the proof of the proposition.
Having established the existence of equilibrium investment levels (I * H , I * L ) of the suppliers which are functions of the buyer parallel sourcing duration T , we need to concern ourselves the existence of the buyer's optimal T * given the suppliers' optimal response functions (I * H (T ), I * L (T )). Whenever T * exists, the strategy
} is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) strategy of our buyer-supplier Stackelberg game.
Since the set T is a finite set, the objective function of the buyer (5), denoted by π buyer (T ), takes on a finite number of values in T . Both the maximum and the maximizer T * of π buyer (T ) exist. Therefore, we have proved the existence of a pure strategy SPNE {T * , (I * H , I * L )} to our Stackelberg game for Case I. The arguments for Case II are the same. We state the existence results below as a proposition. As mentioned in the end of section 3.2, we are unable to obtain a closed-form solution of the optimal investment levels nor any analytical solution for the optimal contract duration T * due to the tedious and intractable functional forms of the first order conditions of the suppliers' optimization problems. By using numerical computation, we were able to derive some interesting observations with regards to the optimal contract duration T and its effect on the suppliers' optimal investment levels . In addition, we were able to characterize when parallel sourcing outperforms selecting the high quality supplier with certainty. In the next section, we present our numerical results and observations.
Proposition 7 Given Assumption 1-5 hold, there exists a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

Numerical Results
Using numerical computation, we were able to derive some interesting observations with regards to the optimal contract duration for the buyer. In our examples, we assumed that C(I) = χ( . In running our simulations, we first ran systematic simulations to obtain our observations and then randomly generate a few thousands sets of model parameters to verify these observations. 
Parameter Possible Values
Observations from Case I
As a starting point, it is quite revealing to examine how the suppliers' optimal investment levels are affected by T , q H , and q L . A first interesting observation from our simulations can be gained by comparing figures 1 and 2. Both figures show the optimal investment levels for suppliers q H and q L for different contract durations, as well as the buyer's expected profit as a result of those investment levels. Furthermore, the figures plot the probability that the buyer selected the high quality supplier at time T . Note that in both figures, the optimal contract duration (i.e., the T which maximizes the buyer's expected profit) does not maximizes the probability that the high supplier is selected. In addition, note that after T * , both suppliers' optimal investment levels decrease sharply. We observed this behavior in all of our simulation runs. one of the suppliers is known to be of a quality much lower than the other. Likewise, with such a large difference between the two quality types, the buyer requires a much shorter observation period in order to differentiate between the two (with high accuracy). Finally, the longer the parallel sourcing period T, the lower the optimal investment level chosen by the high quality supplier. All of these forces together imply that a buyer will select a much shorter trial period when the difference between the two supplier types is "large".
In addition to differences between the buyer's optimal T , figures 1 and 2 also demonstrate some interesting optimal investment behavior. In the case where (q H , q L ) = (0.2, 0.45), the low quality supplier's optimal investment decreases initially, and then begins to increase for T > 0.2, while the high quality supplier's optimal investment decreases for all T . This should be expected, for as the trial period increases beyond a certain duration, the lower quality supplier is assured the buyer's business for a longer period and is willing to investment more. While the high quality supplier is also assured the buyer's business for a longer duration, its "prize" is decreasing, and hence, so are its optimal investment levels. This is to be contrasted with the case where (q H , q L ) = (0.2, 0.23). Under such a setting, we observe that the suppliers engage in a "fight for the prize" as T increases. That is, the suppliers continue to undertake more investment as T increases up to 0.7. For all contract durations between 0.1 and 0.7, the probability that the high supplier is selected is slightly above 50%. We can deduce that the low quality supplier finds it beneficial to continue to invest more at T increases to counteract the reduction in quality "noise" up until T = 0.7. This in turn encourages fiercer investment from the high quality supplier. For contract durations greater than 0.7, the prize is no longer worth the cost of keeping Pr(F H > F L ) low, and the low quality supplier (mimicked by the high quality supplier) significantly decreases its optimal investment level.
From all of our simulations, we are able to extrapolate the following observations with regards to the optimal investment levels and contract duration. The following observations are made when both suppliers, in particular, the low quality supplier, find it optimal to invest a positive amount in equilibrium. All of these observations are stated holding all other parameters constant. 
Observation 4. The optimal contract duration T * is increasing in σ. (3), (5), (7) and (8) in tables 4-6, and observation (6) in table 7. While many of these observations are intuitive, some are worthy of further discussion.
We might expect that a high supplier who is operating in a noisier environment (high σ) would invest more so as to differentiate himself from the low quality supplier. In fact, we find exactly the opposite to be true (observations (2) and (4)). As illustrated in table 3b, when σ increases, both suppliers decrease their investment levels for all T ; however, the suppliers continue to "fight" for the prize and increase their investments for larger values of T , implying that it is optimal for the buyer to parallel source for a longer duration. Furthermore, as we would expect, each supplier's optimal investment levels decreases in χ. What is interesting is that, while (I * L − I * H ) is not necessarily decreasing in χ, the rate at which the suppliers optimal investment levels change results implies that the expected difference in supplier quality is increasing in χ (observation (3)). In addition to insight on the suppliers' and buyer's optimal behaviors given a contract (p S , D, T ) our numerical simulations also provided insight into the appropriateness of a parallel sourcing as a supplier selection mechanism. We found the surprising result that, even if a buyer knows who the high quality supplier is, it is often advantageous for her to parallel source with the supplier of known lesser quality for some duration T . This is due to the competitive pressure parallel sourcing exerts on the high supplier's optimal investment levels. We say that one sourcing strategy dominates another if it yields the buyer a higher expected profit. The observations (9)- (12) are driven by the competitive pressure parallel sourcing exerts on the high supplier's optimal investment levels, thereby, assuaging the "double marginalization" effect. In all instances when parallel sourcing dominates sole sourcing with q H , I * H is significantly greater than I H only . However, it is important to note that the converse is not always true, there are several instances in tables 2-7 where I * H >I H only and yet parallel sourcing does not dominate sole sourcing with q H 7 .
Another interesting observation from tables 4-6 is that π H is not necessarily decreasing in χ, i.e., a higher investment cost does not imply that the high quality supplier will have a lower expected profit. This result appears to be driven by the probability that the high quality supplier is chosen as χ increases; when χ increases from 50 to 100 in table 6 (for q H = 0.2 and 0.3) we see that Pr( F H > F L ) increases, driven in large part by the substantial decrease in I * L relative to I * H . These factors combined imply that sometime a high quality supplier is better off facing a higher cost of investment due to the adverse effect it has on its opponent's investment level. 7 It is important to point out that I * H is not always greater than I H only ; parallel sourcing fails to motivate the high supplier to exert more effort than if he were the sole supplier when (i) the cost of investment χ is large relative to the potential revenues ( p S and D) and the probability of being chosen at T * is low and (ii) (q L -q H ) is large, i.e., the low type supplier is of significantly lower quality than the high type supplier.
Managerial Insights
We found the surprising result that, even if a buyer knows who the high quality supplier is, it is often advantageous for her to parallel source with the supplier of known lesser quality for some duration T . This is due to the competitive pressure parallel sourcing exerts on the high supplier's optimal investment levels.
Our simulations indicate that when presented with the opportunity, a buyer would be strictly better off sourcing from two suppliers of comparably high quality, rather than sole sourcing. This is true provided that the cost of quality improving measures is moderate (Observation 9). We can understand this result from observation (1), i.e., I * H is decreasing in q L . As q L decreases (i.e., the supplier's quality improves), q H must invest more so as to improve its chances of being selected at T . This increase in I * H , in turn, makes parallel sourcing more attractive to the buyer.
From our discussions with various companies we found that parallel sourcing is an especially attractive sourcing strategy when a buyer wishes to "prod" a lethargic incumbent supplier into taking quality improving actions. For example, Solectron, used a trial period with winner-take-all approach in procuring a cable commodity with two suppliers, one of which was an incumbent firm (Caltabiano (2001)). The decision to parallel source was made after Solectron doubted that its incumbent was providing it with a high quality product at a reasonable price. Solectron was able to effectively parallel source due to the presence of an alternative supplier of "comparable" quality. Similarly, what allowed the Department of Defense's experience with General Electric and Pratt and Whitney to be a great success was the lack of large disparity between the two company's production abilities. In the case of Solectron, the credible threat from the competing non-incumbent provided a strong incentive for the incumbent to invest more in maintaining or improving the high level of product quality. As a result, the incumbent won the tournament and hence the remainder of Solectron's business. In fact, most companies with whom we spoke echoed a similar story. Incumbent suppliers have an advantage relative to new suppliers with regards to their familiarity with the buyer's demands. This knowledge often allows them to provide the buyer with a higher level of service. While in most cases the incumbent suppliers eventually win the tournament, the threat of losing business to an identified alternative supplier raises the performance of the incumbent supplier and quality of its product.
Our simulations demonstrate that when χ is relatively small, then a buyer can coax high investment levels out of the high quality supplier without competition; that in combination with the loss in quality (and hence profit) arising from sourcing from q L , makes parallel sourcing unattractive to the buyer. On the other hand, when χ is very large, the presence of competition may make the high quality supplier invest even less than if it were the sole supplier. The greatest benefit from parallel sourcing occurs when χ is moderate and the loss in quality associated with sourcing from q L is not very large. We also observed that when the suppliers are of high quality, it is optimal to parallel source for almost the entire contract duration.
Furthermore, the benefits of parallel sourcing over sole sourcing increase as the noise in the supply chain, (2)). A smaller σ induces the suppliers to increase their investment levels and fight for the prize, yielding a higher realized quality level, and hence profit, for the buyer.
In addition, we found that parallel sourcing is more likely to dominate sole sourcing with q H when p S is high ; p S may be high if the suppliers have relatively more market power than the buyer and hence are able to extract a higher transaction price. This is a result of observation (5): As p S increases, so does I * L and more importantly, I * H . The higher investment levels yield a higher realized quality for the buyer than if she were to have sole sourced with the high quality supplier all along.
Observations from Case II
For Case II, we perform simulations with the same set of parameters as those used in Case I. As for the parameter α that represents the probability of a suppliers having quality q H , we take α from interval [0.25, 0.75] with the consideration that we want the probability of the suppliers being of different qualities to be "substantial". For α ∈ [0.25, 0.75], we examine three representative cases in which α is low, medium, and high, respectively. In particular, we take α to be 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75.
We find that observations (1)- (8) (1) can be seen in table 8, observations (2) and (4) in table 9, observations (3), (5), (7) and (8) in tables [10] [11] [12] (tables 10-13 are listed in the Appendix), and observation (6) in table 13.
In addition to characterizing the optimal contract duration as a function of supplier characteristics and α, we also examined when parallel sourcing would dominate selecting the "highest" quality supplier in the market with certainty (as done in section 3.1 for Case I). In Case II, it is possible that both suppliers are of low quality. Since the probability of each supplier being a high quality supplier is α, the buyer, with
2 , encounters two low quality suppliers. Hence, the buyer has to use a low quality supplier with probability (1 − α) 2 and she encounters at least one high quality supplier, and thus uses a high quality supplier, with probability (1 − (1 − α) 2 ). The ex ante expected profit and supplier investment levels that 
With the "selecting the best supplier" scheme defined, our simulation results indicate that not only our hybrid sourcing mechanism can still dominate the "selecting the best supplier" scheme, but also observations (9)- (12) hold true. Specifically, observations (9) and (10) can be seen in tables 10-12, observation (11) seen in table 8, and observation (12) seen in table 9. The reasoning behind these observations is as stated in the previous section. In addition, we observed that parallel sourcing dominates "selecting the best supplier" more often when the probability of having different types of suppliers is substantial (i.e. α is not very far away from 0.5).
Conclusion
When a buyer faces a set of suppliers of unknown quality and unobservable investments, she must design a sourcing arrangement that allows her to both extract some information about the suppliers and encourage (costly) investments on their part. In this paper we seek to establish when parallel sourcing is an appropriate strategy for the buyer. We found that parallel sourcing can be an effective sourcing strategy for a buyer concerned with selecting a supplier of high quality. The benefits of parallel sourcing during the selection process are two-pronged: (1) it gives the buyer a chance to observe and learn more about the suppliers' qualities; and (2) it motivates suppliers to undertake costly investment by promising the supplier who delivers the higher quality level the entirety of its business once the trial period is over, in effect offering the winning supplier a prize. Via our numerical runs, we were able to characterize the optimal duration of the parallel sourcing period as a function of the supplier characteristics. In addition, we found that parallel sourcing dominates sole sourcing with the high quality supplier under a variety of supplier settings.
Evidence for our theoretical and numerical results can be found in industry practices. Both Solectron and the Department of Defense have successfully employed parallel sourcing with a tournament. As noted by participants in the DOD's parallel sourcing arrangement, "the most important lesson to draw from the engine experience is the value of competition. Competition is the only sure way to get the best effort." (Drewes (1987) pg. 151).
The results of this research naturally lead to many interesting questions. In this paper, we assumed that the buyer knows the possible quality levels of her potential suppliers. However, in some situations, the buyer has relatively little information about the suppliers' qualities. In order to remedy her lack of information, a buyer often will undertake costly actions so as to improve her information about a supplier's quality. For example, it is commonplace for Solectron, a major electronic manufacturing firm, to send a team out to conduct site visits at a potential supplier's site. These site visits are costly to Solectron; therefore, it would be of great value to be able to quantify the value of such information. That is, if a buyer decides to parallel source, what is the value of knowing what types of suppliers she faces? This paper took a step in the direction of answering this question by considering the case where the buyer is not certain if the suppliers are of the same or different quality levels. It would be interesting to carry this relaxation further and consider the case where the buyer only knows that a supplier's quality is distributed according to some distribution function.
Another interesting extension is related to the fact that the suppliers in our model are asymmetric only in their intrinsic quality attribute q and are assumed to be symmetric (in the sense of sharing common forms)
in their "technology" function f (q, I) and the cost function C(I). Here we interpret f (q, I) as a technology function transforming q and I into some productivity measure such as the quality of the final outputs. The suppliers may well be different in the way that they convert intrinsic quality and investments into true productivity measures and in their investment cost structures. Namely, the functions f (q, I) and C(I) may be of different forms for different suppliers and the functional forms are private information to the suppliers.
While we would expect that the increasing amount of private information possessed by potential asymmetric suppliers would make the hybrid sourcing scheme a more favorable choice than any other traditional sourcing schemes to a buyer, it is another area for future research. Table 4 : Simulation output for suppliers when p S = 2, ¾ = 0:1, and D = 100. Table 5 : Simulation output for suppliers when p S = 3, ¾ = 0:1, and D = 100. 
